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In her Introduction to the Spanish edition of John Donne’s Songs and Sonnets, Purificación Ribes 
touches briefly on the subject of scientific development during the Renaissance: 
Numerosos críticos han llamado la atención sobre la actualidad de sus imágenes, a 
menudo vinculadas a los ámbitos de la Astronomía, la Física, la Medicina, la 
Geografía, la Botánica e incluso la Alquimia. En sus poemas son constantes las 
alusiones a las esferas, los mapas, los músculos, el cerebro, las raíces, o el elixir de la 
Alquimia, y lo son en una proporción más elevada que en cualquier otro poeta 
coetáneo. Pero esta frecuencia de uso, que pone de relieve un interés por todo cuanto 
le rodea, no debe llevarnos a erróneas hipótesis que lo califiquen de innovador. 
Donne en éste, como en otros aspectos, participa plenamente de los postulados de su 
época. Y en la Inglaterra de finales del siglo XVI se suscribían de manera 
generalizada las doctrinas de Ptolomeo, Plinio, Aristóteles o Galeno. (1996: 15-16) 
Purificación Ribes has done a highly valuable job of philological elucidation. Her edition is full 
of perceptive comments and helpful notes. Nevertheless, I have the feeling that in her brief discussion 
about Donne’s handling of Renaissance scientific ideas, Ribes has entirely misconstrued the issue. 
Her opinion springs, after all, from an age-old tradition of criticism that refuses to acknowledge 
Donne’s commitment to some of the most hazardous and far-reaching aspects of the Copernican 
world-view. This tradition grew with and is largely influenced by English literary provincialism, 
cultural insularity, and a dogged resolve to turn Donne into a partisan of religious orthodoxy. The 
critical strategy underlying this tradition is to remove the most strident, heteredox, and daring aspects 
of Donne’s world-view by reducing them to mere figurative waste or rhetorical extravagance. 
Rosemund Tuve was the critic who most insisted on the rhetorical nature of some of Donne’s most 
hazardous images. A systematic application of her central view would force us to understand the 
identification between the two lovers and a world or between the idealized woman and a world in 
poems like The Good Morrow, The Sun Rising and The First Anniversarie, as being mere instances of 
the trope of amplificatio or hyperbole. This kind of understanding accounts for the proliferation of 
marginal and shallow paraphrase, in the form of rhapsodic footnotes, refering to the new 
cosmological ideas that are so pervasive in the editions of Donne’s love and religious poetry. Any 
cosmological expression that hints at the existence of a sun-centered planetary system, of an infinite 
or eccentric universe, or of a plurality of worlds, is readily accounted for by means of an ad hoc
footnote reference to Donne’s intellectual curiosity and to his occasional and playful manipulation of 
ideas coming from the new science. Despite this intermittent presence of extravagant ideas, Donne’s 
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poetry is regarded by these critics as an orthodox body of writing framed within an orthodox body of 
cosmological, theological, and political theory. His cosmological extravagance is seen as the result of 
a calculated and controlled rhetorical mise en scène, rather than as the effect of an inescapable verbal 
errancy originating in epistemological puzzle. The new universe that his poems ostensibly formulate 
is regarded as a sort of figurative surplus steming from the rhetorical investment of the figure of 
hyperbole. I quote from Tuve’s study: 
Hence it seems to me illegitimate to fit out Donne’s poems with overtones which 
diverge ambiguously from his apparent meaning and which are only to be traced in 
the connotations of his image-terms. (1947: 213) 
Donne becomes here the surer artist, in full possession of his verse and in complete command of his 
tropes. The latter are regarded as capricious turns and whimsical acrobacies deliberately veiling the 
expression of certitudes and ideas fostered by the clearer and more mature thinker (Tuve 1947: 213). 
Needless to say, mature stands in this context for traditional, i.e., orthodox. And yet, the hypothesis 
of an intellectually mature and clear Donne necessarily overlooked the charge of skepticism so 
frequently levelled against the English poet. To remove this charge became another way of playing 
down the extent and depth of Donne’s commitment to the new universe. T.S.Eliot, the most 
influential of critics, said in 1931 in an essay entitled “Donne in his Time”: “Donne was, I insist, no 
sceptic” (Spencer 1932: 11-12). If we go back to his earlier approach to Donne, especially to the 
Clark Lectures delivered at Trinity College (Cambridge) in 1926, the picture that he draws is still 
basically the same, although there is a strenuous and rather obessive insistance on the formally 
aberrant nature of his belief. The English poet is not seen as a sceptic, but as a potential believer 
lacking the gift of consistent feeling and clear thought. Donne is described as: 
(a) mind of the trecento in disorder; capable of experiencing and setting down 
many super-sensuous feelings, only these feelings are of a mind in chaos, not of a 
mind in order. The immediate experience passes into thought; and this thought, far 
from attaining belief, is thought “insincere”, because it does not reach belief; but his 
feeling of the thought is perfectly sincere. (1993: 133) 
One can hardly avoid thinking on the bewilderment that a paragraph like this could produce on a 
tough-minded linguist and philosopher as Searle, should he ever come across it in one of his off-the-
job vagaries. I am not simply surmising. The irony, I think, runs much deeper. In his toughtful 
analysis of the nature of intentional states, Searle declared that in order to understand a belief as a 
representation we had to consider both a propositional content and a psychological mode that 
determined its direction of fit (1983: 12). We need only to apply this terminology to Eliot’s 
judgement to realize that he acknowledges the presence of a propositional content or thought in 
Donne’s verse while rejecting the existence of a true direction of fit. The perplexed manner of Eliot’s 
argument finds therefore an unexpected echo in Searle’s own words: 
What shall we say about those Intentional states that do not have a direction of fit? 
Are they representations too? And, if so, what are their conditions of satisfaction? 
And what about fantasy and imagination? And what do they represent? (1983: 13-14) 
These are exactly the questions that should concern us in our attempt to understand Eliot’s remarks. 
“Las ideas se tienen. En las creencias se está”: Ortega’s famous dictum comes promptly to mind to 
help us in our task, for we are trying to understand the nature of a poetic representation - a thought - 
which apparently refuses to turn into belief. The traditional idea is that Donne could aptly think and 
cogently represent an infinite and chaotic universe in which he never believed. In my opinion, the 
entire issue is made to rest upon a fanciful psychological mystification, i.e., the “direction of fit” 
which is almost without exception eradicated from Donne’s alleged pre-poetic mental states. Donne 
thought, he represented his thought, but did not believe in it. This baffles me. The perplexity deepens 
when I see Eliot change the nature of his accusations. His original picture of a poet incapable of 
belief becomes the picture of a poet incapable of thought. The American poet had used Dante as an 
example of a poet capable of reconciling a metaphysical system and a poetical world. Unlike Dante, 
Donne had no philosophy at all ( …) I judge him (apart from the large proportion 
of his reading which is not medieval at all) by the way in which he read, and judge 
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him to be exactly of his own moment of time. What is clear is that Donne read a great 
deal without order or valuation, and that he thought in a spasmodic and fragmentary 
way when he thought at all. (1993: 83) 
The paragraph by Purificación Ribes that I quoted at the beginning of this essay should be read in 
the light of this concrete prejudice. According to Eliot, Donne read broadly, but his readings followed 
no order, accorded to no plan. Donne thought scarcely, and when he did his thoughts were 
fragmentary and nourished no possible belief: “it is never quite certain that he believes anything” 
(1983: 132). This assumption survives among those critics who, like Ribes, see in Donne’s references 
to the new universe a mere evidence of his anarchic and updated erudition. Let’s consider first one of 
the unspoken premises of this assumption. It seems quite clear that Eliot’s judgement is dominated by 
a powerful underlying belief: good or strong poets (Lucretius, Dante, Goethe) inscribe their verse 
within a solid philosophical system. Such assumption had been validated by George Santayana, the 
Spanish-born American philosopher that taught at Harvard at the beginning of the century and whose 
course on religion, belief and poetry T.S.Eliot attended in June of 1910 (some of the ideas that 
Santayana was using in this course entered into his book Three Philosophical Poets, 1910). 
According to Santayana, poetry is an expression of the idea and not an ornament to the idea (“Poetry 
cannot be spread upon things like butter”, Santayana 1936: 331). But this theory can be no longer 
hold. Bloom has sufficiently proved that strong poets do not introduce their verse in a preexisiting 
system, but rather create their own philosophical systems through their verse. Poetry is cognition. 
Rather than using ideas, strong poets generate ideas in the linguistic and rhetorical medium of their 
verse. And these ideas are always fragmentary forms of a fragmentary and changing belief. 
In spite of striking differences of thought and temperament, Tuve and Eliot meet in their ability 
to overlook a major problem: “what does a poem mean?”. This question can hardly be separated from 
the central and implicit puzzle of traditional poetics: “How does a poem mean?” Tuve seems to 
maintain that the meaning of a poem is somehow independent of its rhetorical or figurative 
dimension, that is to say, that the tropological stance serves only to give a certain twist to a meaning 
which is already there. Her view springs from the old prejudice that conceives rhetorical figures as 
clothes that cover thoughts. “Die Sprache verkleidet die Gedanken” said Wittgenstein in his 
Tractatus (1985: 68). The post-kantian supporters of the ornamental conception of rhetorics would 
transform this sentence into the following: “Die (rhetorische) Sprache verkleidet die Gedanken”. The 
idea is already present in Dante, who in his Vita Nuova declared: “Grande vergogna sarebbe a colui 
che rimasse cose sotto veste di figura o di colore retorico, e poscia, domandato, non sapesse denudare 
le sue parole da cotale vesta” (1994: 196). It is not an accident that Paul de Man should speak, in a 
polemical essay, of the “perennial problem” and “recognized source of embarrasment” that 
metaphors, tropes, and figural language in general traditionally meant for philosophical discourse and 
literary analysis (1978: 16). Eliot, in turn, seems to assume that a poem means insofar as it can be 
properly placed within a larger metaphysical frame. How are we then to understand the following 
metaphors:
She is all States, and all Princes, I. 
Nothing else is. (The Sun Rising)
Let sea-discoverers to new worlds have gone, 
Let Maps to other, worlds on worlds have showne, 
Let us possesse one world, each hath one, and is one. (The Good Morrow)
Are these metaphors to be inserted within a larger Neoplatonic theory capable of accomodating the 
plural outrage of an infinitely expanded soul, or of the lovers turned into a single world? Are these 
metaphors to be read, then, as sincere manifestations of a Neoplatonic belief, or are they to be 
understood as mere exagerations, extravagant hyperboles of a burning and restless imagination? 
These questions conceal a deeper issue: is it legitimate to distinguish between what is said and what 
is meant inside a poem? Under which conditions are we allowed to surmise that rhetorical or 
figurative language means something? How are we to decide the exact extent of Donne’s 
commitment to the semantic strength of his imagery? Is this imagery ornamental, marginal, 
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incidental, accessory and meaningless, or is it, on the contrary, essential, central, necessary and 
meaningful? In other words: are these images metaphors at all? I think that we should always 
consider the possibility that Donne’s Copernican and Neoplatonic imagery is not just a persuasive or 
ornamental device - a performative trope or masquerader - but rather, and to remain in De Man’s use 
of Austin’s terminology, that such imagery is loaded with a precise cognitive or constative force (De 
Man 1979: 119-131). This inevitably entails the acceptance of one the most disturbing lessons that 
the Belgian critic was ever to derive from Nietzsche: 
Tropes are not understood aesthetically, as ornament, nor are they understood 
semantically as a figurative meaning that derives from literal, proper denomination. 
Rather, the reverse is the case. The trope is not a derived, marginal, or aberrant form 
of language but the linguistic paradigm par excellence. The figurative structure is not 
one linguistic mode among others but it characterizes language as such. (1979: 105) 
This resource to De Man’s understanding of language implies a number of risks. First of all, his 
idea of literature was too drastically confined to things written after Rousseau. Second, he never quite 
managed to explain the nature of what he called the “cognitive dimension” of language. In any event, 
what seems indisputable is that his restless exploration on the sources of rhetorical meaning helped to 
unveil many misconceptions about the nature of authorial intention. It is no longer possible, I think, 
to speak of language, emotion, thought, belief and reality as if they were separate things that a writer 
can handle at will, in an objective fashion. And that is exactly what Ribes is doing when she speaks 
of the “frequency of use” (frecuencia de uso) of certain scientific images in Donne’s poetry as the 
consequence of a contemporary interest, shared by many writers of his time, in the spectuacular 
advancement of their many learnings. 
This problem echoes the countless perplexities that arise when we inspect the way in which 
critics discuss Shakespeare’s cosmological imagery. The traditional position, largely invented by 
Tillyard (1990: 17-25), is to insist on his orthodox and conservative acceptance of the old, medieval, 
Ptolemaic world, and to disclaim his adventures into the world of infinity, chaos, disproportion (so 
abundant in his tragedies and Roman plays) as mere rhetorical devices intended to enhance the 
dramatic atmosphere of the plays. Moreover, this assumption found unexpected support on previous 
readings by Spurgeon and Clemen, a body of rhetorical interpretation which doubtless helped to 
systematize the verbal manifestations of chaos in Shakespeare’s writing. From a contemporary point 
of view, this assumption seems to leave too many questions unanswered. To begin with, it impairs 
literary analysis with the burden of a catastrophic conception of historiography. The entire discussion 
becomes undesirably Hegelian: the critic noses about the texts with the only interest of finding out 
whether the author’s spirit was active before or after a certain break, i.e., to ascertain the author’s 
insertion within the all-embracing dialectic sway of the Absolute spirit: is Donne a medieval or a 
Renaissance thinker? Where is his verse located, before or after the break? Hegelian is still, after all, 
the dominating conception of cultural history that speaks about world-views, world-pictures,
Weltanschauungen, paradigms and a large etcetera of related notions. We could also include two 
presumably anti-Hegelian ideas, Foucault’s épistémè or categorie de pensée (1966: 45-48) and 
Althusser’s coupure épistemologique. This last notion seems particularly helpful, for it aptly 
describes the mechanism of change that presumably gave birth to new renaissance science. The 
history of this notion is particularly fascinating. The Marxist philosopher first used this term in 1965 
in his book Pour Marx. The English edition, For Marx, offered a discussion of this metaphor in the 
“Glossary” (1969: 249). In “A letter to the translator” (1969: 257-258) Althusser explained his 
indebtness to Bachelard’ La formation de l’esprit scientifique, eventhough the term was not to be 
found in his work. Moreover, Althusser declared that his use of the metaphor was removed from 
Canguillem’s non-systematic application of it in his Études d’Histoire et de Philosphie des Sciences.
In Lire le Capital, the French philosopher employed a number of related metaphors, like “mutation 
épistémologique” (1969 I: 11), “décalage théorique” (I: 17), “changement du terrain”, “changement 
d’horizon” (I: 24), “crise dialectique” (I: 28), “rupture épistémologique” (II: 11) all of which seemed 
to announce the firmly established trope of “coupure épistemologique” (II: 16). Some of these 
alternative metaphors, especially change of horizon and change of terrain, seem particularly 
appropriate to the nature of the progressive change that took place in the epistemological foundations 
of renaissance cosmology. Moreover, they refer to such change in terms of a temporal sequence, 
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unlike the metaphor coupure, which entails a drastic, sudden and mechanical transformation. 
Althusser’s terminological hesitation was an evidence of his problematic understanding of the idea of 
epistemological change. He was aware that such change could only take place in discourse, that any 
epistemological transformation was after all the result of precise textual events, to use an idea 
explored by Deleuze (1969: 15-30). It is in this context of linguistic awareness that we should insert 
our discussion of Donne’s commitment to the epistemology of the new science, for it is in this very 
context that rhetorical events could become invested of an extraordinary cognitive significance. The 
uncritical assumption that distinguishes between central poetic meanings, inserted in larger 
ideological or theoretical frames, and marginal or surrounding rhetorical trifle should be, therefore, 
severely corrected. Rhetorical language is the only language. It accounts for innovation in the 
epistemolical grounds of science and philosophy. And it also accounts, as Hayden White has 
skillfully argued, for the strategies of emplotment that characterize the narrative forms of history 
(1989: 25-26). If there is a cognitive change, we can only know of it through metaphor. For metaphor 
means, after all, translation: movement, change, décalage. Moreover, it is quite pointless to ask 
whether we plan our metaphors or whether we believe in them or not. In this sense, I would like to 
quote from Jameson’s penetrating essay on the nature of postmodern theory. He summarizes a new 
historicist axiom embodied in the Michael-Knapp program essay “Against theory”: 
That is not, however, what the essay “meant” by “theory”, something that can be 
recapitulated with all the concision of its authors, namely, “the tendency to generate 
theoretical problems by spliting apart terms that are in fact inseparable” (AT 12). This 
tendency is then identified and localized in two kinds of privileged error: the 
separation of “authorial intention and the meaning of texts” (AT 12), and a larger, or 
more “epistemological” pathology, in which “knowledge” is separated from 
“beliefs”, generating the notion that we can somehow “stand outside our beliefs” (AT 
27). (1991: 182) 
Now we see that both Tuve and Eliot were under a theoretical spell, a sort of pathology that 
manifests itself in the form of compulsive split or separation: Tuve separated the authorial intention 
from the meaning of the text, and Eliot separates knowledge from belief. What Jameson has just 
outlined is more a hermeneutic manner than a tradition. A manner of looking at Donne, a reading 
habit which we could describe as conservative and ingenuous. Fortunately, this manner was revised 
early-on. This revision began as an acknowledgement that Donne’s familiarity with the new 
cosmological theories was something more than a caprice. In the Introduction to his famous edition 
of the Metaphysical Lyrics and Poems of the Seventeenth Century, Grierson mentions “the new 
science of Copernicus and Galileo” (1995: 2) and “the new learning of Copernicus and Paracelsus” 
(1995: 7). These were just scattered and fragmentary references. The first serious steps were taken by 
Marjorie Nicolson in her essays of the thirties devoted to the impact of the new astronomy in the 
English literary imagination. But it was Coffin who was to write in 1937 the first large study on the 
subject, John Donne and the New Philosophy. And it is within this tradition of criticism, prone to 
listen to outlandish voices within Donne’s writting, that Empson began, in the late forties, to write his 
essays on so polemic a subject. These essays have been recently published on a single volume under 
the title John Donne and the New Philosophy by Cambridge University Press. Paradoxically enough, 
this publication coincided with the edition of Eliot’s Clark Lectures entitled The Varieties of 
Metaphysical Poetry. None of these books are mentioned by Purificación Ribes in the bibliography 
of her 1996 Spanish edition of the Songs and Sonnets. She might have submitted her manuscript to 
the editors before these books were published in England. This wouldn’t explain, however, the 
omission of Coffin’s study, published - I repeat - in 1937. In any case, and leaving aside the reasons 
for these regrettable exclusions, I would like to emphasize the importance of these books, and 
especially of Empson’s study, for it throws new light on the open-ended discussion about Donne’s 
philosophy. And yet, I find it necessary to anticipate a serious warning. Despite the immense effort 
Empson made to prove Donne’s knowledge of the cosmological theories of the new philosophy, his 
hypothesis seems rather impractical for it is devastated by terminological inaccuracy. Too many and 
too different things fall into the all-embracing category of new philosophy, and this ambiguity is 
something that Empson inherited from his predecessors in this line of research. I will just single out 
the most relevant epistemological frames traditionally associated with the idea of new philosophy: 
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- Italian Neoplatonism of the XVth century, with its version of a metaphysical 
Pampsychism, and theories of the Universal Mind. 
- The so-called Copernican theory (De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium, 1543) 
which is the result of a mathematical hypothesis. 
- Kepler’s mathematical research and his pseudo-scientific visions of space-travel in 
Somnium (available to Donne in 1610). 
- Galileo’s empirical investigations with the telescope in Venice. (Sidereus Nuncius,
1610)
These frames are very different and sometimes openly opposed. Their epistemological statuses are 
extremely distant: metaphysical, mathematical, empirical … Moreover, the books in which these 
frames appear obey to altogether different textual rules. References to the Copernican sun-centered 
planetary system are frequent in Donne’s writings, both in his poetry and in his prose. Copernicus 
himself became a character in Donne’s modest Inferno, his Ignatius his Conclave (1610) where he 
was portrayed in a sympathetic fashion. Kepler and Galileo were also present in this work, although 
not in personal robes, like Copernicus, but through references to the new stars (1969: 7) that echo 
both Kepler’s discoveries of two stellae novae (1602 and 1604) and Galileo’s description of new 
stars with the help of the cannocchiale or telescope (Galilei 1993: 86). But these discoveries are 
empirical discoveries and have nothing to do with the mathematical research carried out by 
Copernicus, let alone the Neo-platonic pantheism of Cusa (Cassirer 1976: 53-102) or the Atomism 
(Kargon 1983: 15-29; Jesi 1972: 151-184)) which was quickly spreading through England sometimes 
disguised as Occultism or Alchemy. These two traditions met in the Northumberland Circle, a sort of 
esoteric brotherhood of intellectuals, scientists and writers, led by the Earl of Northumberland. John 
Donne didn’t hide his sympathy towards some members of this group, (John Dee, Thomas Harriot, 
Nicholas Hill, Thomas Digges); he owned some of their books, like Hill’s Philosophia Epicurea
(1601), and he had met personally the Wizard Earl. This connection, which is beginning to be 
thoughtfully explored in recent years (Haffenden 1993: 37-42), will throw decisive light on the 
problem of Donne’s ideology or world-view. Moreover, this recent line of research, somehow 
fostered by Francis Yates seminal studies on the Art of Memory, has helped to bring to sharp focus 
the figure of Giordano Bruno, probably the most important philosopher of the period, a thinker who 
spent two decisive years in England (1583-1585), where he published his most relevant philosophical 
dialogues, La cena de le ceneri, De l’infinito universo e i mondi, De la causa, principio et uno, 
Spaccio de la Bestia trionfante, Cabala del cavallo pegaseo and Eroici furori. Bruno’s world-view 
was an adaptation of Precocratic ideas about the infinity of the world and Neoplatonic (Plotinian) 
ideas about a Universal Soul/Mind to the Copernican cosmological system (Jiménez Heffernan 1997: 
223-302). What Bruno did was to follow with unknown consistency and feverish determination one 
of Copernicus’ explicit suggestions. The Polish astronomer could not accept the hypothesis of an 
infinite universe within his mathematical construction, for this acceptance meant doing away with the 
scientific rigour of his research. However, he openly invited philosophers to consider such 
possibility: “sive igitur finitus sit mundus, sive infinitus, disputationi physiologorum dimittamus” 
(1975: 72), that is, “we leave it to the philosophers to decide whether the world is finite or infinite”. 
In his English translation of some decisive books of Copernicus’ De revoutionibus, Thomas Digges 
introduced the same idea of an infinite expansion of the last sphere (Digges 1934). And yet, Digges’ 
infinity remained basically a religious heaven, although there is still strong evidence supporting the 
thesis that he might have had empirical access to a telescope (Johnson 1968: 173-175). Bruno’s 
infinity stems, on the contrary, from a complex metaphysical hypothesis, its most immediate and 
dangerous consequence being the unflinching identificacion between transcendence and immanence 
(Gentile 1991: 109-120). Bruno’s universe becomes an ontological realm of pure immanence and 
infinite possibility (Ciliberto 1996: 70-78). The dominating assumption of a mens insita omnibus, of a 
universal mind pervading the entire universe was paradoxically reconciled with the picture of an 
indeterminate, aberrant, eccentric, and chaotic world. According to Blumenberg “Bruno’s universe is 
without coherence and structure” (1987: 367). The Italian thinker did away with the Aristotelian idea 
of place. Nothing, in Bruno’s universe, occupies a fixed place, a determinate location (Jiménez 
Heffernan 1996: 439-451). All things - stars, planets, seas, stones, animals, human beings, elements - 
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occupy a transitory place in a world made of a single and ever-changing substance; a world which is 
placeless place, or, like Wallace Stevens’ place of the solitaries, a place in perpetual undulation:
Ecco la raggion de la mutazion vicissitudinale del tutto, per cui cosa non è di male 
da cui non s’esca, cosa non è di buono a cui non s’incorra, mentre per l’infinito 
campo, per la perpetua mutazione, tutta la sustanza persevera medesima ed una. 
(Bruno 1958: 359) 
I am obviously summarizing the basic characterisitics of Bruno’s universe. I think, however, that 
this brief picture is enough to allow me to suggest the nature of Bruno’s influence of Donne: 
1. One is the feeling of permanent dislocation of place that we find in Donne’s verse 
and also in his Sermons and Devotions. We perceive it in the line “She is all 
States, and all Princes, I” that seems written inside the furious grammar of 
cosmological desire which is typically Brunian (Nelson 1958) 
2. The second is the feeling of existencial urge (in the forms of erotic compulsion or 
eschatological anxiety) that dominates his verse and that he shares with other 
metaphysical poets, like Herbert or Marvell. This urge can be better understood if 
set against the background of Bruno’s infinite, restless, and ever-changing 
universe.
In relation to the first of the characteristics mentioned, the dislocation of place, I would like to make 
reference to a specific rhetorical strategy, the imagery of flight, that we find in Ignatius his Conclave
and that is taken directly from Bruno’s Cena de le ceneri:
I was in an Extasie, and My little wandring sportful Soule, / Ghest, and Companion 
of my body, had liberty to wander through all places, and to survey and reckon all the 
roomes, and all the volumes of the heavens, and to comprehend the situation, the 
dimensions, the nature, the people, and the policy, both of the swimming Islands, the 
Planets, and of all those which are fixed in the firmament. (Donne 1969: 6-7) 
Or ecco quello, ch’ha varcato l’aria, penetrato il cielo, discorse le stelle, traspassati 
gli margini del mondo, fatte svanir le fantastiche muraglia de le prime, ottave, none, 
decime ed altre, che vi s’avesser potuto aggiongere … (Bruno 1958: 33) 
There is something inescapably Marlovian about this spatial frenzy, about this irrefrenable 
vocation to break through cosmological limits. The inmediate effect of such cognitive urge was 
wisely described by Greenblatt as an absence of scenery: “That man is homeless, that all places are 
alike, is linked to man’s inner state, to the uncircumscirbed hell he carries within” (Greenblatt 1980: 
197). In Bruno, this uncircumscribed hell took the form of an limitless heaven. Identically, Donne 
could terminate his inspection of hell - “I saw all the roomes of Hell open to my sight” (1969: 7) - but 
he could never bring his exploration of heaven to a proper end, nor exhaust his strength when looking 
into the lovers infinitenesse. Donne’s world looks very much like Bruno’s: both are unbounded, 
placeless, unrestrained, ontologically productive and fearfully erotic. 
Before I finish, I would kike to tease out some implications from one of the adjectives I have just 
used: placeless. Louis Martz wrote in the fifties a famous study in which he managed to prove that 
Donne’s poetry was strongly influenced by St.Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercices, and that many of his 
poems were actually written using the structure of the Ignatian meditation. According to the Spanish 
saint, the first step in a meditative exercise was the composition of place, that is, the imaginative 
visualization of a concrete place where the drama of the devotional dialogue between a man and the 
Lord was going to occur. Martz applied this meditative model to many metaphysical poems. Oddly 
enough, Martz used Donne’s First Anniversarie. If we look closely at this poem, we realize that 
instead of a composition of place, the poet has chosen to bring forth a decomposition of place. Donne 
opposes two worlds, a separate world of harmony where the little girl’s soul is going to escape to and 
an immanent world of utter disproportion and chaos. It is my contention that this last world is 
probably a poetical reformulation of Bruno’s chaotic and aberrant infinite universe. Many lines of 
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this poem create an exact reverse or inversion of Ulyses’ famous speech of order in Shakespeare’s 
Troilus and Cressida (I,iii,75-137). Chaos, destruction, endless production and eternal transformation 
are the Brunian notions that support the imaginative construction of this amazing poem: 
Which, from the carcasse of the old world, free, 
Creates a new world; and new creatures be 
Produced (75-77) 
We are borne ruinous: poor mothers crie, 
That children come not right, nor orderly, 
Except they headlong come, and fall upon 
An ominous precipitation. (95-99) 
Then, as mankinde, so is the worlds whole frame 
Quite out of joynt, almost created lame. (191-192) 
Wronging each joynt of th’universall frame (198) 
So did the world from the first hour decay, 
The evening was beginning of the day (200-201) 
The Sun is lost, and th’earth, and no mans wit 
Can well direct him, where to looke for it. (207-208) 
Tis all in pieces, all cohaerence gone. (213) 
To go to heaven, we make heaven como to us. (282) 
The worlds proportion disfigured is. (303) 
Utter immanence, sheer relativism, relentless eccentricity. These three are constant figurative features 
of the Brunian universe. But where does the figure end? Which are the limits of the trope, the limits 
of the game? Where does Donne stop using an idea and begins to beleive in it? Where does the 
rhetorical mise en scène cancel out making room for knowledge? To the knowledge - now we truly 
realize it - that all scenes are impossible, that the absence of scene is something more than a 
figurative atmosphere, a rhetorical ornament, or a frenzied dance of tropes. The meaning of this poem 
is still an arresting puzzle for many critics. The problem is that most readers have confined their 
attention to the religious symbolism of the girl’s cosmological redemption. What if we look instead at 
the aberrant world, the ominous precipitation that the girl is leaving behind? What if we look at the 
deserts of vast eternity or at the merciless hurry of Time in Marvell’s To his Coy Mistress? What if 
we look at the bottomless chaos over which Milton’s characters play their heroic games of salvation? 
We might begin to realize that certain metaphors, certain amplifications and certain hyperboles are 
the real meaning of poems, and that the rest is just an organized escape from this central and 
unbearable chaos. It is through words that we change horizons. It is through words that we move 
from one terrain to another. It is through words too that we loose horizons, loose terrain. And that is a 
strange form of cognition that we can hardly express and that we sometimes call infinite life, 
sometimes infinite love: “No, no dejéis cerradas / las puertas de la noche.” 
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